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The objective of this paper is to examine whether inflation targeting 
has added to the credibility of central banks. We examine the information 
content of the term structure for future inflation. There is strong evidence that 
there is no built-in credibility of announcing inflation targets. We classify the 
credibility as ‘credibility of intention’, ‘credibility of ability’ and ‘credibility of 
future monetary policy’. It seems that the initial years of inflation targeting 
can be interpreted as an effort to gain the credibility of ability.  
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The objective of this paper is to examine whether inflation 
targeting has indeed added to the credibility of central banks. 
Credibility is defined here as the extent to which changes in the yield 
curve reflect expected changes in inflation. We analyse whether the 
move to inflation targeting has had an impact on credibility and 
compare the results to countries that target the growth of monetary 
aggregates or the exchange rate. The analysis in this paper may also 
shed light on the importance of the speed of disinflation for monetary 
policy credibility and the time it takes to develop credibility after a 
change in regime. 
The next section provides a motivation for this paper and a 
review of the literature on the credibility of inflation targets. Section 3 
sets out the monetary transmission mechanism, expectations theory 
and its relevance for the credibility of monetary policy frameworks. 
Section 4 describes the approach to the credibility issue, whereas 
section 5 presents the expectational and causal interpretation of the 
credibility parameter (β n) under the assumption of rational 
expectations. Section 6 gives the empirical results and the last 
section presents a brief summary and conclusions. 
II. MOTIVATION AND LITERATURE SURVEY 
The literature on the importance of central bank credibility for 
the effectiveness of monetary policy has progressed rapidly over the 
past decade or so (see Cukierman 1992, Briault, Haldane and King, 
1996 and Nolan and Schaling, 1996 for an overview). From this 
literature it appears that central bank (or monetary policy) credibility 
and transparency are mutually dependent variables. Credibility 
facilitates the transmission and the acceptance of the central bank’s  
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true policy intentions by the public, and conversely policy 
transparency contributes to credibility. But credibility is not gained 
overnight, central banks have to pass a test over a number of years in 
terms of achieving favourable monetary policy outcomes for the 
domestic economy, as well as being committed to their publicly 
declared objectives. Since at least the beginning of the 1990s almost 
every central bank has considered price stability (i.e. low inflation) its 
primary policy objective. Favourable monetary policy is therefore 
traditionally interpreted as one that leads to price stability, without 
significant output losses. When a high inflation country wants to make 
a transition to price stability a policy of gradualism is most likely to be 
credible and such a gradual disinflationary approach is more likely to 
limit output losses than a ‘cold turkey’ policy. 
Credibility has important effects on the public’s inflation 
expectations. Since inflation expectations affect forward-looking wage 
contracts and long-term nominal interest rates, credibility also has 
direct links to the real side of the economy. For example, if a central 
bank changes its monetary regime or lowers its inflation target, and if 
the economic agents quickly perceive this change as credible, such 
that their inflation expectations are lowered, expected inflation errors 
will be non-systematic and output losses will consequently be 
minimised. In this respect, credibility helps a central bank in achieving 
its announced policy objectives, because it reduces the output costs 
of disinflationary monetary policy.  
Over decades, both monetary theorists and policy makers have 
evaluated the costs and benefits of different approaches to achieving 
price stability, both in terms of monetary regime and in terms of speed 
of disinflation. During the Bretton Woods era, exchange rate stability 
was considered to be the best means of achieving domestic price  
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stability. After its breakdown some countries resorted to monetary 
targeting (e.g. Germany, Switzerland), while others continued to hold 
on to some form of managed exchange rate system (the most 
prominent example being the ERM in Europe, which resulted in the 
creation of the euro in January 1999). Other countries changed 
regime frequently over time (such as the UK) or did not adhere to an 
explicit regime at all (e.g. Japan and US). In the 1990s a steadily 
increasing number of (industrialised and developing) countries have 
adopted some form of explicit inflation targeting as their main policy 
strategy (with New Zealand being the first in 1989 and Iceland and 
Norway as the most recent converts), in which the monetary 
authorities make explicit commitments to achieving and maintaining 
low rates of inflation in the medium run. 
Siklos (1998) summarises possible ways of gaining credibility in 
inflation targeting regimes as follows: a) Inflation targeting can help 
clarify the tasks of the central bank and quantify them in an objective 
and verifiable manner, b) By adopting statutes that ensure the 
autonomy of the central bank, the location of the responsibility for 
meeting the targets is well defined, c) Experience with an inflation 
targeting regime can readily influence expectations of inflation which 
are central to economic agents’ decision making process. Central 
bank accountability and transparency than take on important roles. 
Svensson (99) claims that in a credible inflation-targeting regime, 
there is no possibility of a liquidity trap since private inflation 
expectations will be anchored to the inflation target and the level of 
real interest rates should stimulate the economy. 
Due to the limited success of previous monetary regimes, such 
as exchange rate and monetary targeting, in terms of achieving low 
and stable inflation, many industrialised and developing economies  
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have adopted a form of direct inflation targeting since the late 1980s. 
Several authors consider inflation targeting a superior strategy to 
reduce inflation quickly with relatively minor output losses (see Corbo 
et all, 2000). This may be because a policy of inflation targeting is 
more transparent and easier to understand for the public than other 
monetary regimes. This higher transparency in turn may lead to more 
and faster gains in central bank credibility. If an inflation targeting 
central bank clearly states its commitment to low and stable inflation, 
expectations will be adjusted downward in line with actual inflation 
outcomes. Such a credible monetary policy has a stabilising effect on 
the macroeconomy and adds to the success of anti-inflationary 
measures, while keeping output losses small. It is important in the 
build-up of credibility that inflation-targeting central banks allow some 
accommodation of temporary shocks to the economy (see King 
1996). This implies that a central bank’s reaction function includes 
other variables in addition to inflation per se. This enhances 
credibility, because the public learns that price stability is an objective 
that is not to be met at any cost.  
Over the past decade several methods to test the credibility of 
inflation targets have been used. Svensson (1993) adopts the 
following procedure: (i) Subtract the maximum and minimum inflation 
rates which are consistent with the inflation target from the yields to 
maturity on nominal bonds. This results in a target-consistent range of 
real bond yields; (ii) If expected real yields (equals the difference 
between the nominal yield to maturity and the expected inflation rate 
to maturity), or real interest rates bonds - where available - fall 
outside the range of target-consistent real yields, monetary policy 
credibility is rejected. Using this method, Freeman and Willis (1995)  
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derived inflation-target-consistent (ITC) real yield curves from 
equation (1). 
it    =  r t  + E(π) t + θt ,                                                     (1) 
where, it, is the nominal interest rate, rt is the real rate of the same 
maturity,  E(π)  t  is the expected inflation rate over the same time 
horizon, and θt reflects the (time varying) risk premium. But there are 
important weaknesses of this approach. (i) The suitability of ITC 
curves as a basis for assessing progress on policy credibility may 
vary, especially at the short end of the maturity spectrum (Mishkin 
(1990a) states that most fluctuations in the slope of the term structure 
at the very short end reflect changes in the slope of the term structure 
of real interest rates on a one-for-one basis and do not reflect 
changes in expectations about future changes in inflation). (ii) Long-
term interest rates are more likely to be stable than short rates, since, 
over the very long run, the long-term real interest rate is a deep 
parameter reflecting the long-run return on capital. However, over a 
shorter horizon – equal to or less than the length of a typical business 
cycle – even long-term real rates may not be constant, (iii) shifts in 
demand for resources and financial capital over the business cycle, 
along with changes in the current and expected stance of monetary 
policy, could be important sources of cyclical variation of long-term 
rates, (iv) other fundamental factors – including changes in fiscal 
positions, private saving and investment patterns, and technical 
change (both real and financial) in an economy – might influence real 
rates as well. But at the same time, shifts over time in the position of 
an ITC yield curve can happen when either nominal rates change or 
when the inflation rates required to meet particular benchmarks 
changes.   
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In this study, inflation targeting industrial countries – New 
Zealand, Canada, the UK and Sweden, display substantial drops in 
ITC curves between the initial date and several years later. These 
declines – between 3 and 5 percentage points – suggest that a 
substantial gain in credibility occurred in this period, although it may 
not be entirely due to the new monetary framework, inflation 
targeting
1.  
Svensson’s third method in the study is to use forward rates to 
extract the credibility. Svensson also suggests that – if available – 
survey data on inflation expectations can be used to examine the 
credibility of inflation targets by comparing whether these inflation 
expectations fall between the target consistent minimum and 
maximum inflation rates. Using this method, Svensson (99) checked 
the credibility of inflation targets in Sweden for the period 1993-1999. 
Using survey data for 3-5 years ahead, inflation expectations and the 
inflation targets were compared and Svensson found that in the first 3 
years of the inflation-targeting regime the credibility of the target was 
low. But since 1997, inflation expectations have been inside the 
tolerance interval of the inflation targets. From 1998, five-year 
expectations and three-to five-year expectations have been close to 
the 2 percent inflation target. This indicates that to gain credibility is a 
slow process, which sometimes takes almost a half-decade.  
Johnson (1998) uses two approaches by using survey data to 
test the credibility and success of monetary policy. If a country has a 
formal inflation target the difference between the inflation forecast in 
the survey and the announced inflation target is considered a direct 
measure of credibility. The second approach includes all countries in 
                                                 
1 It may reflect also the fact that inflation targeting was introduced after crises, when 
credibility would be below normal.  
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the survey and analyses forecast errors by comparing the inflation 
forecast from the survey with actual inflation. Forecast errors of the 
private sector are related both to the credibility of monetary policy 
(whether the public has confidence in the central bank meeting its 
target rate of inflation) and to the ability of the central bank to keep 
actual inflation close to the target. 
The paper concludes that, it was difficult to establish credible 
inflation targets. Canada and New Zealand were the most credible 
inflation targeting countries, for most countries –both inflation 
targeting and non-inflation-targeting countries-the disinflations of the 
1990s were unanticipated, and there is substantial evidence that 
targets were not instantly credible. 
Siklos (1998) tests the inflation persistence after the 
introduction of inflation targeting in the IT countries, found some 
evidence of a break in inflation persistence for Canada and New 
Zealand. 
Kahn and Parrish (99) estimate central bank interest rate 
reaction functions before and after the adoption of inflation targeting. 
They test the hypothesis that all reaction function coefficients jointly 
are the same in the two periods and use the estimated policy reaction 
function for the pre-inflation targeting regime to forecast the policy 
rate over the post-inflation targeting period. In this study, it appears 
that industrialised economies that have adopted inflation targets 
gained most credibility after the initial successes in lowering inflation. 
This suggests that credibility is endogenous to the results of inflation 
targeting. There are no explicit differences between inflation targeting 
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regimes and other regimes in the 1990s; almost all countries 
analysed show an unexpected decline in inflation rates. 
III. MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM, 
EXPECTATIONS THEORY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE 
MONETARY POLICY 
The standard view of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism is that monetary policy actions affect the economy via 
market interest rates. The monetary transmission mechanism simply 
relies on the expectations theory of the term structure of interest 
rates, which states that long-term rates are an average of current and 
expected future short-term rates over the maturity of the longer-term 
asset
2. A contractionary monetary policy is expected to manifest itself 
in rising short- and long-term rates of interest. In the absence of 
credibility effects, the rise in the central bank’s policy rate leads to an 
increase in current and expected future short-term rates (and 
therefore in longer-term rates across the maturity spectrum as well) 
by altering market expectations. But if monetary contraction is 
expected to succeed in reducing inflation it may reduce implicit future 
nominal short rates in the longer end of the spectrum
3. However, 
empirical analysis of the relationship between monetary policy actions 
and long-term interest rates casts some doubt on this standard view. 
The analysis in Roley and Sellon (1995) shows that the 
response of long-term rates to policy actions can be highly variable 
depending on the changing views of market participants as to the 
future direction of monetary policy. Assuming investors have a four-
                                                 
2 Here, we may ignore the term premium to simplify the analysis. Since the expected 
future rates are uncertain, the investors demand a risk premium to hold longer-term 
securities. 
3 An upward-sloping yield curve may point to loose monetary policy and a downward-
sloping yield curve to a restrictive monetary policy.  
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year horizon and current interest rates are at 4% the paper 
distinguishes five different scenarios according to market 
expectations of future short-term interest rates. The market’s 
expectation may lead to changes in forward rates, which in turn will 
result in different responses of long-term rates. In the first scenario, 
the economic agents expect no change in official rates at all over the 
four-year horizon. This implies that one-year forward rates will remain 
the same as short rates and the term structure will be flat across all 
maturities (Chart 1). 
In scenario two, the central bank raises official rates 
permanently by 1 pp throughout the four-year period. In this case the 
forward rates will also rise by 1 pp for the following three years, which 
means that there will be a parallel shift in the yield curve at all 
maturities to 5 percent. In other words, if investors believe that a 
policy action will persist over the 4-year period, there will be a one-
for-one movement of short and long rates. In the third scenario, 
agents interpret the 1 pp rise in short rates as the first step in a policy 
of further tightening by 1 pp in the second year, with no further 
changes in years three and four. In this case the one-year forward 
rates increase to 6 percent from year two onwards leading to an 
upward-sloping term structure. This scenario represents an 












Scenario four is one in which the first year rate rise is expected 
to be offset in the second year such that forward rates are back at 4% 
from year two onwards. In this case, the one-year rate rises 1 pp, but 
the rates for other maturities remain unchanged, leading to a 
downward sloping term structure. Here, medium- and long-term rates 
rise less than short-term rates in response to the monetary policy 
action, such that the further along the maturity spectrum the less 
rates will rise. Consequently, the yield curve becomes downward 
sloping. Finally, and crucial for our further analysis, if agents expect 
the short-term 1 pp tightening in monetary policy to be reversed by a 
significant easing in the future, forward rates will fall below 4% and 
long-term rates may fall so much that the yield curve becomes 
sharply inverted. This effect represents a credible tightening in 
monetary policy, which results in lower long-term interest rates 
because inflation expectations fall in response to the policy action.  
 
CHART 1





















I: No change in current or future policy. II. Permanent change in policy.
III. Additional tightening expected in Year 2. IV: Temporary tightening.
V: Current tightening followed by future easing.
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IV. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
The behaviour of the term structure has been the subject of a 
wide range of research on whether anti-inflation policies have been 
credible or not. Mishkin (1990a,  1990b, and 1991) finds that, in 
addition to information about future interest rate movements, the term 
structure may also contain information about the future path of 
inflation. The approach is based on the Fisher decomposition (see 
derivation in Estrella et al, 2000), which states that the m-period 
nominal interest rate, it
(m), can be divided into two components: the m-
period ex ante real interest rate, denoted Etrt
(m), and the expected 







.        (2) 
If expectations are rational, the expected inflation rate can be 
written as the realised inflation πt
(m) plus an error term ε
(m)
t+m that is 
orthogonal to information at time t: 
πt
(m) =  Et πt
(m)  + ε
(m)
t+m.        (3) 
Substituting for Et πt




(m) −  Etrt
(m) + ε
(m)
t+m      (4) 
The difference between inflation over the next m years and 
inflation over the next n years (m>n) can be written in estimable form, 
as follows: 
πt
(m) −  πt
(n) = a1
(m,n)  +  β 1
(m,n) (it
(m) - it
(n)) + η (m,n)
1,t+n   (5) 
Where    a1
 (m,n)  = −  (Etrt
(m) −  Etrt
(n) ) is the slope of ex ante real 
rates and  
η (m,n)
1,t+n  =    ε
(m)
t+n −  ε
(n)
t+m       is an error term.   
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Assuming that the real interest rate is constant over time, that expectations 
are formed rationally, the risk premium is constant over time and the composite 
error term has standard properties, the information content of the term structure can 
be testing whether β 1 is significantly different from zero. If this hypothesis 
is rejected, the term structure i t
 (m) - it
 (n), contains significant 
information concerning future changes in inflation and the slope of the 
real term structure does not move one-for-one with that of the 
nominal term structure. 
Mishkin (1990a), estimates equations for the change in inflation 
in three different periods for US data. The results show that the term 
structure for maturities of six months or less does not contain 
significant information about the path of future inflation. Most 
fluctuations in the nominal term structure reflect fluctuations in the 
real term structure and do not imply changes in expectations about 
future inflation. Finally, the estimated β   has increased  during the 
period 1964 to 1979, which means that the rise in long rates reflected 
an increase in inflation expectations. The evidence of much of the 
research shows that the term structure does have a significant role in 
forecasting future changes in inflation, particularly at long maturities. 
This means that the term structure can be used to help assess long-
run inflationary pressures: a steepening of the term structure at the 
longer end may indicate that inflation that will rise several years 
ahead and, conversely, a negative slope indicates an expectation 
inflationary pressures will fall. We can therefore use the term 
structure as an instrument to test the credibility of the relatively young 
regime of inflation targeting. 
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V. THE EXPECTATIONAL AND CAUSAL INTERPRETATION 
OF ββββ N UNDER ASSUMPTION OF RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 
The coefficient β n in equation (5) indicates the information 
content of the nominal term structure of interest rates for future 
changes in inflation. As mentioned above, a value of β n statistically 
different from zero provides evidence that the term structure contains 
significant information about future changes in inflation. A value of β n 
statistically different from one indicates that the slope of the real term 
structure is not constant over time and that the nominal term structure 
contains some information about the real term structure. 
The theoretical relationship between the term structure of 
interest rates and changes in future inflation is based on the 
assumption that the medium-run term structure reflects agents’ 
rational expectations of future changes in inflation. An alternative for 
this interpretation can be as follows; changes in the term structure 
reflect the market’s assessment of the stance of monetary policy for 
reasons explained in Section 4. 
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In the first part of our empirical study the inflation difference 
equations (5) are estimated for each individual country to figure out 
whether the term structure contains information about future inflation.  
The term structure spread is measured as the difference 
between the yield on a long-term government bond and a 3-month 
rate. For Australia, Ireland and New Zealand inflation is estimated as 
100 times the change in log consumer price index over the previous 
four quarters. For the remaining countries, inflation is estimated as 
100 times the change in the log consumer price index over the 
previous twelve months. As stated in Kozicki (1998), measuring  
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inflation over a year reduces measurement difficulties that arise when 
inflation is calculated over shorter intervals. First, month-on-month 
and quarter-on-quarter measures of inflation tend to be volatile, with 
much of the volatility regarded as noise or seasonality.  Second, 
rounding problems introduce spurious volatility in these short-period 
measures of inflation over much of the early sample. 
Table  1 contains summary statistics on the term structure 
spread and one-year inflation rates. For each series, the third column 
reports the sample mean, the fourth column reports the standard 
deviation and the fifth and sixth column report correlation coefficient 
with the spread with one-year inflation rates. The term structure 
spread and inflation are negatively correlated for 11 countries 
(Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and USA) and positively correlated for 12 
countries in our sample.   
Table 2 reports autocorrelation coefficients for one-year inflation 
rates. Inflation persistence refers to an important statistical property of 
inflation, namely that its current value is influenced strongly by its past 
history. In particular, persistence after 24 months is low in Germany, 
Japan, Korea, Sweden and the US. Persistence is high in Canada, 
France, Italy, Portugal, South Africa and Spain. 
Data constraints limit this study to estimate the basic inflation-
change equations of Jorion and Mishkin (1991), Gerlach (1995) and 
Day and Lange (1997) that match the inflation horizons to the band 
maturities in the term structure spread. Inflation-change equations of 
the form, 
πn,t+1
 −  π3,t+1
 = an
  +  β n
 (R120,t – R3,t) + residt+1     (6)  
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are estimated, where (R120,t  – R3,t) is the term structure spread 
between  10 year bond and 3 month treasury bill rate and (πn,t+1
  −  
π3,t+1) is the difference  between πn,t+1, (the n month ex-post inflation 
rate from  month t to month t+n expressed at an annual rate) and 
current inflation π3,t+1.  
The 1-year inflation rate from month t-9 to month t+3 is used for 
π3,t+1,  instead of the 3-month inflation rate from t to t+3 to reduce 
volatility due to noise and rounding of the price index. The horizon, n, 
of the forecast varies between 12, 36 and 60 months
4. 
Table 3 reports the estimation of the inflation-change equation 
(6)
5. The β n  tends to increase in magnitude with n, which can be 
explained by the variability of inflation increasing relative to that of the 
real term structure. Since inflation rates are less variable than real 
interest rates in the short-run, coefficients on the term structure can 
be expected to be smaller for shorter-term maturities than for longer 
maturities. Furthermore, the coefficient is larger for higher correlations 
between the change in expected inflation and the slope of the real 
term structure (Day and Lange, 1997).  
For n = 12, only for Iceland and Japan does the nominal term 
structure of interest rates have information for the future path of the 
inflation, but the sign for β n for Iceland is negative. This result is 
consistent with the previous results in Mishkin (1990a,b and 1991).  
For n = 36, the estimates for β n are significant for 11 of the 23 
countries: Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and 
                                                 
4 Estrella and Mishkin (1997) and Kozicki (1998) also relax the maturity-matching 
restrictions. 
5 Standard errors of coefficient estimates are corrected for heterocedasticity and 
serial correlation using Newey and West (1987) procedure.  
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USA. All counties’ β n estimates are positive except for Iceland, 
Portugal and Spain. 
For n = 60, the estimates for β n are significant for 15 of the 23 
countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and USA. R
2 increases with n for almost all 
countries, which is in line with the findings of Mishkin and Jorion 
(1991). At longer horizons the variability of expected inflation changes 
increases in relation to the variability in the real-term-structure, which 
leads to term structure containing more information about future 
inflation.  
VI.1. A Proxy for the Credibility of Inflation Targeting 
VI.1. a. Individual Country Results 
The extent of the flattening of the yield curve in response to a 
change in the monetary framework or to central bank actions can be 
interpreted as the credibility of the new framework. In this argument, 
the recursive estimation results of the individual countries are given in 
Table 4. 
The expected 1-year-ahead inflation rate for 1997 is the change 
in the CPI from January 1997 to January 1998; the 3-year-ahead 
inflation rate is measured from January 1997 to 2000 January and so 
on. Since the last observation is January 2000 for most of the 
countries, 3-year ahead inflation rate is used to compare the country 
specific β n  before  and after inflation targeting was introduced. The 
chosen starting date for the regressions is 1977, after the end of the 
Bretton Woods era and after first and most of the second round 
effects of the first oil shock to 1997.   
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For all inflation targeting countries, the slope of the term 
structure flattens during the inflation-targeting regime (Table 4). But 
there is no significant change in the term structure spread in the initial 
years of the new regime which means that announcing inflation 
targets does not bring immediate credibility which would reduce 




As stated in King (1996), “in general, an announcement by the 
central bank that in the future the inflation target will be consistent 
with price stability does not command immediate credibility. It takes 
time for the private sector to be convinced that the target will be 
chosen to be consistent with price stability. The private sector will try 
to learn about the true preferences of the central bank. Their 
announcements will not necessarily be taken at face value. Modelling 
learning is difficult”. 
 
CHART 2
















new zealand united kingdom sweden australia
canada finland spain 
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To interpret carefully the initial years of inflation targeting, we 
can use Miller’s (1997) discussion of Johnson’s paper. She 
distinguishes two types of credibility: one is ‘credibility of intent’ and 
the other is “credibility of ability”. If agents believe that the central 
bank will try to hit its target, we can define this as “credibility of intent“, 
and if agents believe that the central bank will be able to control 
inflation, this is the credibility of ability. For an inflation target to be 
credible, a central bank needs both types of credibility. This 
distinction is very important in explaining the initial years of inflation 
targeting regimes, when the central banks have the intention to reach 
their target, which be may describe as them as the credibility of intent. 
But, since they do not yet have a track record in fighting inflation, they 
don’t have the credibility of ability. So, we can interpret the initial 
years of inflation targeting regime as an effort to gain ‘credibility of 
ability’.  
To test if there is a structural change after the adaption of the 
inflation-targeting regime, the Chow Breakpoint Test is used for 
equation 5 for parameter β n and the results are summarised in Table 
6. For Canada, Finland, New Zealand and Sweden the null 
hypothesis of no structural change is rejected at 1- percent 
significance level
6.  
                                                 
6 The test for Australia is not so powerful compared to other countries in the sample. 
To carry out this test, the data are split into two groups and each sub-sample requires 
at least as many observations as the number of parameters. Since there is no 
monthly inflation available for Australia, the inflation targeting regime test is done with 











We find no evidence for a structural shift in the United Kingdom. 
This result is consistent with the result of Ricketts and Rose (1995) 
which points out that the fall in inflation in the 1990s has not been 
interpreted as a move to a low-inflation state for the United Kingdom 
(Chart 3 and Chart 4)
7. 
                                                 
7 For the UK the differences between indexed and unindexed bond yields are 
interesting to observe. Long-term nominal interest rates fell sharply after “operational 
































VI.1. b. Panel Results for Inflation Targeting Countries 
For IT countries, Table 7 summarises the panel regression 
results for Canada, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, which 
are consistent with the individual country results. The coefficients are 
significant statistically and have the expected signs. The slope term 
that is a proxy for inflation expectations slows down considerably after 
1994, almost 3 years after the implementation of the first inflation-
targeting regime (Chart 5). 
 
 
Due to the volatility of Spanish data, the results including this 
country are given at Table 8. The exclusion of Spain does not change 
the results significantly. Another interesting result is that the slope of 
the term structure spread increases after 1996, which is an early 
indication that the inflation expectations increase for the year 1999. 
This result is consistent with Siklos (1997) who finds that the private 
sector inflation expectations in inflation targeting countries picked up 
in 1996, for the year 1997.  
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The panel results regardless of the regime (money, exchange 
rate or inflation targeting) of the inflation targeting countries are 
summarised in Tables 9 and 10. The term structure spread flattens 
but not as much as in the results shown in Table 7 and 8. There is no 
indication of the rise in inflation expectations for 1999 that we have 
found in Table 7 and 8.  
Table  11 compares the inflation targeting countries over 
different monetary regimes. When we compare their monetary 
regimes and the period over which they target inflation, there is no 
difference if we take into consideration the common effects model. 
But according to the fixed effects model, they do better in inflation 
targeting periods compared to periods when they adhere to other 
monetary regimes. So, the result is inconclusive if we compare 
monetary and inflation targeting periods for countries that target 
inflation at the moment. 
If we compare monetary and inflation targeting regimes with 
exchange rate targeting periods, there is evidence that the monetary 
and inflation targeting regimes are superior to exchange rate targeting 
regimes in reducing inflation expectations. Section 6.3 provides more 
detail on the differences in credibility between IT and other monetary 
regimes. 
This result is consistent with the results of Alogoskoufis and 
Smith (1991). In their study, they find that monetary and exchange-
rate accommodation increases stet the gold standard and Bretton 
Woods to managed-exchange-rate regimes. These shifts coincide 
with the increase in the persistence of both average and relative 
inflation rates. Fixed-exchange rate regimes based on gold seem to 
have resulted in low monetary accommodation and low inflation 
persistence. What is required for low inflation persistence is credible  
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lack of accommodation. This credibility can be achieved through 
some form of precommitment.  A gold standard is one way to achieve 
it, another way is central bank independence, coupled with monetary 
constitutions that put a lot of weight on price stability (Barro, 1982).  
The common approach in both inflation targeting regimes and 
money targeting regimes is their pre-commitment to a pre-announced 
policy of targeting a nominal anchor. Both of them have credible lack 
of accommodation, which obtain low inflation persistence and 
expectations. 
VI.2. A Proxy for the Credibility of the European Union (EU) 
Nominees after the Maastricht Treaty 
The most important stage of the EU was the Treaty for 
European Economic and Monetary Union, which was agreed in 
December 1991 and signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992. This 
treaty established the institutional framework for monetary policy 
under European Monetary Union, a timetable for the creation of a 
monetary union, and the criteria for country participation. One of the 
most influential criteria in the Maastricht Treaty (MT) is about the 
inflation rate, which requires an ambitious inflation target rate
8, from 
their nominees to be realised in 1998. 
Tables 12a and 12b summarise the results of the EU countries 
after the announcement of the Treaty. The slope of the term structure 
picks up in Germany and Austria in the following two years after the 
MT, which indicates that the credibility of the Treaty was not sufficient 
to flatten the term structure in these countries. On the contrary, 
agents believed that the interest rates would be higher for a couple of 
years, which fits our second and third scenario in section 3. Although  
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the reputation in fighting inflation has been very high for Germany, 
this result is surprising. Here, we should bear in mind the re-
unification of Germany and its spill over effects for a number of years 
which may have led to some loss in credibility in their monetary policy 
(Chart 5). For the other nominees, we found negative signs for the β n 
for the countries Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.  
The term structure flattens for Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy 
and Netherlands that points out which indicate that there is no 
common conclusion for slope of the term structure spread for the 
countries of the EU nominees after the MT. 
The panel results for EU nominees indicate that there is no 
change in the slope term of the term structure spread in the initial 
years after the MT. In 1992, financial markets did not expect EMU to 




                                                                                                                   
8 It was to have inflation no more than 1% higher than the average of 3 lowest 
countries 
















This points out that to promise a regime change or an 
announcement of ambitious economic targets for the future do not 
provide initial (or ex-ante) credibility for the countries. This result is 
similar for the inflation targeting countries, which do not gain 
important credibility at the beginning of their regimes. 
VI. 3. The Credibility of the Inflation Targeting Regime 
Compared to Other Regimes 
Table 14 summarises the results of the world regimes during 
the period 1960 to 1997. In addition to inflation targeting countries 
and EU members, we add more countries where data are available 
for long-term interest rates. These countries are Iceland, Japan, 
Korea, Norway, South Africa, Switzerland and the US. For the whole 
period, October 1960 to December 1997, which encompasses the 
credibility parameter, is 0.22. When we exclude inflation-targeting 
periods from our sample, the credibility parameter increases 0.22 to 
0.27, which implies that there is evidence that the inflation 
expectations surged compared to the average of our sample, for all 
whole monetary targeting regimes before 1992. If only the inflation-
targeting period is taken into consideration, there is an important 
downward change in the credibility parameter, but this is statistically 
insignificant. Here we may conclude that there is a worldwide fall in 
the inflation expectations for the period 1992 and 1997. 
To check the role of the inflation targeting countries during the 
inflation-targeting period, we exclude inflation targeting countries from 
the world sample and run the same regressions for the other 
countries. The results are summarised in Table 15. The credibility 
parameters decline almost 50 percent for the whole sample, which 
suggests the credibility of inflation targeting regimes, is lower on  
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average compared to the other regimes in our sample period 1960 to 
1997. 
The world regressions are repeated excluding the EU nominees 
to test the importance of convergence criteria for world inflation 
expectations. Table 16 summarises the results of the regression, 
which points out that the parameters for the whole period and the 
period before inflation targeting increase above the level that we find 
for the world and for the sample excluding inflation targeting 
countries. This result gives some evidence to conclude that the 
convergence criteria for the EU nominees have led to a decrease in 
inflation expectations and for the whole period they have been doing 
better than the other countries.   
VII. CONCLUSION 
This study analyses the credibility of the inflation-targeting 
monetary framework. Although in the recent literature, there is a 
tendency to interpret all credible monetary regimes (like Germany and 
Switzerland) as being in practice equivalent to inflation targeting 
regimes (Bernanke et all 1999, Svensson 2000), we define their 
regimes as announced by the central banks. We find strong evidence 
that there is no in-built credibility of announcing inflation targets. 
There is a learning process of the private sector to figure out the true 
intentions and capability of central banks in reaching their targets. 
The answer for the EU nominees is no different. There is strong 
evidence that the announcement of the convergence criteria has led 
to increase in inflation expectations in Germany after the 
announcement of EMU which – until the start of the euro - has been 
accepted by the public at large as the most credible monetary regime 
in the world so far. This is a clear indication that if a country already  
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has a credible monetary regime and its announcement to converge its 
economy with other less credible regimes may lead to a loss of 
credibility of that country in the initial periods. Here, we should point 
out the fact that the re-unification of Germany might have affected the 
credibility of the monetary policy as well.  
Structural break point tests indicate that there is a structural 
change in inflation expectations after the IT regime for Canada, 
Finland, New Zealand and Sweden, but we find no evidence of that 
for the UK, Spain and Australia. The panel data study for the inflation 
targeting countries indicates that they are not doing better in terms of 
inflation expectations than under monetary targeting regimes period 
but they are better off compared to their exchange rate targeting 
periods. This result is consistent with Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991), 
who point out the importance of commitment after finding evidence of 
the superiority of monetary targeting regimes to exchange rate 
regimes. Here, we can conclude that the details of the monetary 
regimes are not so important for gaining credibility. The important 
factor for credibility is the perception by the public of the central 
bank’s previous performance (track record) and its willingness 
(eagerness) to fight inflation in the future. An alternative way to gain 
credibility may be convergence of the economy to another economy 
with a credible monetary policy. In other words, anchoring your 
monetary policy to the more credible other monetary regimes. For 
example, in a monetary union, a central bank cannot respond to 




                                                 
10 An example is Ireland which cannot reduce inflation because of the weakness of 
the German and French economies.  
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     Standard Correlation  with 
Country Series  Data 
Interval 
Mean Deviation  Spread  Inflation 
AUSTRALIA  SPREAD      69:q3  -
2000:q4  
0.97  1.65  1.00 0.29 
  INFLATION   61:q1 -
2000:q3 
5.82 4.30 0.29  1.00 
AUSTRIA  SPREAD       71:m1 -
1998:m12  
1.62  1.57  1.00 0.05 
  INFLATION   61:m1 -
2000:m3 
3.93 2.17  0.05  1.00 
BELGIUM  SPREAD       60:m1 -
2000:m12  
0.62  1.18  1.00 -0.16 
  INFLATION   61:q1 -
2000:m12 
4.27 3.05 -0.16  1.00 
CANADA  SPREAD       60:m1 -
2000:m12  
0.8  1.36  1.00 -0.47 
  INFLATION 61:q1 -
2000:m12 
4.69 3.30 -0.47  1.00 
DENMARK  SPREAD    79:m2  -
2001:m2 
1.48 2.47 1.00 0.48 
  INFLATION   68:m1 -
2000:m12 
5.99 3.93 0.48  1.00 
NETHERLAND  SPREAD    64:m11 -
1998:m12  
1.38 2.02 1.00 0.17 
  INFLATION 61:m1 -
2000:m12 
4.13 2.74 0.17  1.00 
FINLAND  SPREAD       71:m5 -
2000: m4  
1.33 2.34 1.00 0.18 
  INFLATION 61:m1 -
2000:m12 
6.24 4.47 0.18  1.00 
FRANCE  SPREAD 70:m1 -
2000:m12  
0.58  1.41  1.00 -0.14 
  INFLATION   61:m1 -
2000:m12 
5.45 3.89 -0.14  1.00 
GERMANY  SPREAD   75:m7  -
2000:m12  
1.54  1.06  1.00 -0.45 
  INFLATION   61:m1 -
2000:m12 
3.14  1.88  -0.45  1.00 
ICELAND  SPREAD   92:m1 -
2001:m1  
1.75  1.82  1.00 0.01 
  INFLATION   84:m1 -
2000:m12 
11.8  12.3  0.01  1.00 
IRELAND  SPREAD 72:q3  -
2000:q4  
1.28 3.19  1.00 0.47 
  INFLATION 61:q1 -
2000:q3 
7.24 5.93 0.47  1.00 
ITALY  SPREAD   77:m3  -
2000:m12  
0.31 0.94 1.00 -0.25 
  INFLATION   61:m1 -
2000:m12 
7.87 6.00 -0.25  1.00  
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JAPAN  SPREAD 69:m1 -
2001:m2  
0.41  1.86  1.00 -0.72 
  INFLATION   61:m1 -
2000:m12 
4.45 4.49 -0.72  1.00 
KOREA  SPREAD   76:m8  -
2000:m12  
1.54 2.92 1.00 0.46 
  INFLATION 71:m1 -
2000:m12 
9.35 7.73 0.46  1.00 
NEW ZEALAND  SPREAD   60:q1 -
2000:q4  
1.19  1.58  1.00 0.02 
  INFLATION   61:q1 -
2000:q3 
7.26 5.59 0.02  1.00 
NORWAY  SPREAD   71:m8 -
2000:m12  
-0.29 2.10  1.00 -0.09 
  INFLATION 61:m1 -
2000:m12 
5.73 3.33 -0.09  1.00 
PORTUGAL  SPREAD   82:m4  -
1999:m3  
1.83  1.46  1.00 0.10 
  INFLATION   61:m1 -
2000:m12 
11.22 8.77  0.10  1.00 
SOUTH AFR.  SPREAD   60:m1 -
2000:m11  
2.02 2.40 1.00 0.02 
  INFLATION 61:m1 -
2000:m11 
9.28 5.02 0.02  1.00 
SPAIN  SPREAD 74:m1 -
2000:m11  
-0.22 2.93  1.00 -0.44 
  INFLATION 61:m1 -
2000:m11 
8.72 5.76 -0.44  1.00 
SWEDEN  SPREAD 60:m3  -
2000:m12  
0.99  1.80  1.00 -0.08 
  INFLATION 61:m1 -
2000:m11 
5.81 3.70 -0.08  1.00 
SWITZERLAND  SPREAD   74:m1 -
2000:m12  
0.25  1.88  1.00 -0.62 
  INFLATION   61:m1 -
2000:m11 
3.44 2.40 -0.62  1.00 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
SPREAD   64:m1 -
2000:m12  
1.10  1.99  1.00 0.29 
  INFLATION   61:m1 -
2000:m12 
6.88 5.32 0.29  1.00 
USA  SPREAD 60:m1 -
2000:m12  
0.71  1.03  1.00 -0.42 
  INFLATION 61:m1 -
2000:m12 














          Lag (months) 
1  12 24 
AUSTRALIA  0.97 0.79 0.59 
AUSTRIA  0.97 0.68 0.50 
BELGIUM  0.99 0.77 0.53 
CANADA  0.99 0.82 0.64 
DENMARK  0.98 0.70 0.63 
FINLAND  0.99 0.76 0.55 
FRANCE  0.99 0.87 0.74 
GERMANY  0.98 0.69 0.42 
ICELAND  0.93 0.59 0.53 
IRELAND  0.96 0.81 0.65 
ITALY  0.99 0.81 0.69 
JAPAN  0.98 0.66 0.44 
KOREA  0.99 0.58 0.25 
NETHERLAND  0.97 0.74 0.61 
NEW ZEALAND  0.96 0.73 0.60 
NORWAY  0.98 0.64 0.54 
PORTUGAL  0.98 0.73 0.65 
SOUTH AFR.  0.99 0.82 0.73 
SPAIN  0.94 0.73 0.67 
SWEDEN  0.98 0.67 0.53 
SWITZERLAND  0.97 0.63 0.29 
UNITED KINGDOM 0.99 0.72 0.53 









ESTIMATION RESULTS - INFLATION-CHANGE EQUATIONS 
πn,t+1−  π3,t+1 = αn  +  βn [R120,t − R3,t] + residt+1 
 
Country Period Horizon β n         SE (β n) R
2
(N)
1969:3 - 1999:3 4 0.20 0.33 0.02
AUSTRALIA 1969:3 - 1997:3 12 0.59* 0.23 0.09
1969:3 - 1995:3 20 0.73* 0.27 0.10
1971:01 - 1998:12 12 0.04 0.07 0.003
AUSTRIA 1977:01 - 1997:123 6 0 . 0 7 0 . 130 . 0 0 4
1971:01 - 1995:126 0 0 . 2 1 0.150 . 0 3
1960:10 - 1998:12 120 . 0 2 0 . 10 0.0005
BELGIUM 1960:10 - 1997:123 6 0 . 2 8 0 . 180 . 0 3
1960:10 - 1995:11 60 0.50* 0.23 0.07
1960:10 - 1999:12 120 . 120 . 100 . 0 2
CANADA 1960:10 - 1997:12 36 0.50* 0.160 . 15
1960:10 - 1995:12 60 0.88* 0.160 . 2 6
1979:02 - 1999:12 12 ?0.03 0.08 0.004
DENMARK 1979:02 - 1997:123 6 ? 0 . 12 0.09 0.05
1979:02 - 1995:12 60 ?0.24* 0.09 0.15
1971:05 - 1999:12 120 . 18 0.09 0.04
FINLAND 1971:05 - 1997:12 36 0.26* 0.130 . 0 9
1971:05 - 1995:12 60 0.50* 0.23 0.10
1970:01 - 1999:12 120 . 11 0.140 . 0 1
FRANCE 1970:01 - 1997:12 36 0.36* 0.180 . 0 4
1970:01 - 1995:12 60 0.44 0.24 0.03
1960:10 - 1998:12 12 0.03 0.07 0.002
GERMANY 1960:10 - 1997:123 6 0 . 15* 0.06 0.05
1960:10 - 1995:126 0 0 . 4 2 0 . 120 . 14
1992:01 - 1999:12 12 ?0.47* 0.170 . 2 0
ICELAND 1992:01 - 1997:12 36 ?0.49* 0.11 0.28
1992:01 - 1995:12 60 ?0.42* 0.130 . 19
1972:1 - 1999:3 4 -0.04 0.120 . 0 0 1
IRELAND 1972:1 - 1997:3 120 . 11 0.20 0.04
1972:1 - 1995:3 20 0.66* 0.22 0.09
1977:03 - 1999:12 12 0.38 0.24 0.05
ITALY 1977:03 - 1997:12 36 0.58 0.43 0.04
1977:03 - 1995:12 60 0.54 0.58 0.02
1971:06 - 1999:12 12 0.97* 0.30 0.20
JAPAN 1971:06 - 1997:123 6 1.54* 0.31 0.29
1971:06 - 1995:126 0 1.77* 0.37 0.37
1976:08 - 1999:12 12 0.05 0.25 0.002
KOREA 1976:08 - 1997:12 36 ?0.30 0.33 0.02
1971:08 - 1995:12 60 ?0.64 0.39 0.05
1964:11 - 1998:12 12 ?0.08 0.06 0.012
NETHERLAND 1964:11 - 1997:12 36 ?0.09 0.100 . 0 0 9
1964:11 - 1995:12 60 ?0.08 0.11 0.005
1960:4 - 1998:4 4 ?0.16 0.20 0.006
NEW ZEALAND 1960:4 - 1997:3 12 0.42 0.24 0.06
1960:4 - 1995:3 20 0.79* 0.39 0.05
1971:08 - 1999:12 12 0.03 0.06 0.001
NORWAY 1971:08 - 1997:123 6 0 . 14 0.09 0.01
1971:08 - 1995:126 0 0 . 140 . 120 . 0 1
1984:04 - 1999:03 12 ?0.0089 0.170 . 0 0
PORTUGAL 1984:04 - 1997:12 36 ?0.53* 0.120 . 0 6
1984:04 - 1995:126 0 ? 1.06* 0.180 . 3 9
1960:10 - 1999:11 12 ?0.040 0.120 . 0 0 2
SOUTH AFRICA 1960:10 - 1997:11 36 ?0.120 . 150 . 0 1
1960:10 - 1995:11 60 ?0.088 0.170 . 0 0 4
1977:01 - 1999:12 120 . 130 . 120 . 0 3
SPAIN 1977:01 - 1997:123 6 ? 0 . 16* 0.04 0.17
1977:01 - 1995:12 60 ?0.27* 0.06 0.21
1960:10 - 1999:12 120 . 2 4 0 . 140 . 0 4
SWEDEN 1960:10 - 1997:12 36 0.58* 0.150 . 16
1960:10 - 1995:12 60 0.73* 0.150 . 19
1974:01 - 1999:12 120 . 0 8 0 . 100 . 0 0 8
SWITZERLAND 1974:01 - 1997:123 6 0 . 5 1*0 . 150 . 17
1974:01 - 1995:12 60 0.79* 0.31 0.31
1964:01 - 1999:12 120 . 14 0.22 0.007
UNITED KINGDOM 1960:01 - 1997:12 36 0.70* 0.28 0.09
1960:01 - 1995:126 0 1.07* 0.30 0.17
1960:10 - 1999:12 120 . 0 3 0 . 180 . 0 0
USA 1960:10 - 1997:12 36 0.70* 0.26 0.09




RECURSIVE ESTIMATION RESULTS - INFLATION-CHANGE 
EQUATIONS FOR INFLATION TARGETING COUNTRIES 









Whole  Before After IT Regime
Period  IT Regime 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year
69:3 - 97:3 77:1 - 94:2 77:1 - 95:3 77:1 - 96:3 77:1 - 97:3
AUSTRALIA Est. βn 0.59* 0.63* 0.54* 0.53* 0.55*
t 2.52 3.15 2.76 2.74 2.86
R
2
0.09 0.22 0.170 . 160 . 16
Whole Before  After IT Regime
Period IT Regime 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year
60:10 - 97:12 77:1 - 91:01 77:1 - 92:02 77:1 - 93:02 77:01 - 94:02 77:01 - 95:02 77:01 - 96:02 77:01 - 97:02
CANADA Est. βn 0.50* 0.51* 0.49* 0.46* 0.48* 0.40* 0.36* 0.36*
t 3.53 3.01 2.92 2.83 3.14 2.63 2.55 2.47
R
2
0.170 . 160 . 150 . 150 . 170 . 130 . 130 . 12
Whole Before  After IT Regime
Period IT Regime 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year
FINLAND 71:05 - 97:12 77:1 - 93:01 77:1 - 94:02 77:1 - 95:02 77:01 - 96:02 77:01 - 97:02
Est. βn 0.26* 0.40* 0.39* 0.33* 0.32* 0.29*
t 2.51 3.12 3.03 3.06 3.183 . 15
R
2
0.09 0.26 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.2
Whole Before  After IT Regime
Period IT Regime 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year
NEW 60:04 - 97:3 77:1 - 89:04 77:1 - 91:01 77:1 - 92:01 77:01 - 93:01 77:01 - 94:01 77:01 - 95:01 77:01 - 96:01 77:01 - 96:01
ZEALAND Est. βn 0.42 1.38* 1.37* 1.21* 1.04* 1.02* 0.91* 0.78 0.68
t 1.76 2.33 2.47 2.54 2.45 2.47 2.211 .96 1.80
R
2
0.06 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.180 . 170 . 150 . 120 . 1
Whole Before  After IT Regime
Period IT Regime 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year
SPAIN 78:01 - 97:12 78:1 - 93:10 78:1 - 94:11 78:1 - 95:11 78:01 - 96:11 78:01 - 97:11
Est. βn (-)0.18* (-)0.17* (-)0.19* (-)0.20* (-)0.19* (-)0.18*
t -4.39 -3.60 -4.20 -4.70 -4.67 -4.43
R
2
0.180 . 150 . 18 0.22 0.2 (-)0.18
Whole Before  After IT Regime
Period IT Regime 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year
SWEDEN 60:10 - 97:12 77:1 - 92:12 77:1 - 94:01 77:1 - 95:01 77:01 - 96:01 77:01 - 97:01
Est. βn 0.58* 0.81* 0.82* 0.73* 0.70* 0.69*
t 3.98 3.48 3.46 3.183 . 0 3 3 . 14
R
2
0.16 0.27 0.27 0.23 0.21 0.21
Whole Before  After IT Regime
Period IT Regime 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year
UNITED  64:01 - 97:12 77:1 - 92:09 77:1 - 93:10 77:1 - 94:107 7 : 0 1 - 95:107 7 : 0 1 - 96:10 77:01 - 97:10
KINGDOM Est. βn 0.70* 0.92* 0.92* 0.89* 0.86* 0.86* 0.85*
t 2.49 3.54 3.74 3.85 3.86 3.91 3.93
R
2
0.09 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 
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TABLE 5 












NEW ZEALAND 0.82 0.36
SPAIN 835 0.00
SWEDEN 2.52 0.11
UNITED KINGDOM 0.45 0.50




NEW ZEALAND 16.65 0.00
SPAIN 5.43 0.07
SWEDEN 25.3 0.00
UNITED KINGDOM 2.95 0.23
* Column 1 and 2 give the likelihood ratio Chow test statistic
and its significance level respectively.





NEW ZEALAND – 
SPAIN Haz.98
SWEDEN – 












π n,t+1?  π 3,t+1 = α n  +  β n [R120,t ? R3,t] + resid t+1  (Common Effects Model)
Whole 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period
91:02 - 97:129 1:02 - 92:129 1:02 - 93:129 1:2 - 94:129 1:02 - 95:127 7 : 1 - 96:12
Est. β n 0.37* 1.23* 0.89* 0.49* 0.44* 0.45*
t 6.17 4.02 6.65 4.60 5.39 6.47
R
2 0.120 . 3 7 0 . 3 5 0 . 170 . 140 . 16
π n,t+1?  π 3,t+1 = α n  +  β n [R120,t ? R3,t] + resid t+1  (Fixed Effects Model)
Whole After  IT
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period
91:02 - 97:129 1:02 - 92:129 1:02 - 93:129 1:02 - 94:129 1:02 - 95:129 1:02 - 96:12
Est. β n 0.32* 1.21* 1.04* 0.44* 0.28* 0.33*
t 4.51 4.09 4.76 2.94 3.34 4.11
R
2 0.24 0.50 0.62 0.38 0.41 0.36
Constant Parameters
Canada -1.08 -3.55 -3.27 -1.28 -1.08 -1.21
Finland -0.79 -1.69 -1.44 -0.95 -0.93
Spain -1.29 -2.85 -2.45 -2.11
Sweden -1.62 -2.25 -2.11 -2.14- 1.74
United Kingdom -0.37 -1.47 -1.21 -0.15- 0 . 18- 0 . 2 9
π n,t+1?  π 3,t+1 = α n  +  β n [R120,t ? R3,t] + resid t+1  (Common Effects Model)
Whole 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period
91:02 - 97:129 1:02 - 92:129 1:02 - 93:129 1:2 - 94:129 1:02 - 95:127 7 : 1 - 96:12
Est. β n 0.43* 1.23* 0.89* 0.59* 0.47* 0.46*
t 6.67 4.03 6.65 4.72 5.43 6.03
R
2 0.180 . 3 7 0 . 3 5 0 . 180 . 170 . 18
π n,t+1?  π 3,t+1 = α n  +  β n [R120,t ? R3,t] + resid t+1  (Fixed Effects Model)
Whole After  IT
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period
91:02 - 97:129 1:02 - 92:129 1:02 - 93:129 1:02 - 94:129 1:02 - 95:129 1:02 - 96:12
Est. β n 0.41* 1.21* 1.04* 0.37* 0.31* 0.38*
t 4.53 4.09 4.76 3.32 3.50 4.59
R
2 0.31 0.50 0.62 6.36 0.37 0.32
Constant Parameters
Canada -1.30 -3.55 -3.27 -1.28 -1.14- 1.34
Finland -1.03 -1.69 -1.44 -1.02 -1.09
Sweden -2.80 -2.25 -2.21 -2.17- 1.82





INFLATION TARGETING COUNTRIES WITHOUT TAKING INTO 




INFLATION TARGETING COUNTRIES WITHOUT TAKING INTO 




πn,t+1?  π3,t+1 = αn  + βn [R120,t ? R 3,t] + residt+1  (Common Effects Model)
Whole  Before Inf. After IT Regime
Period Targeting 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year
60:10 - 97:12 77:1 - 91:12 77:1 - 92:12 77:1 - 93:12 77:1 - 94:12 77:1 - 95:12 77:1 - 96:12 77:1 - 97:12
Est. βn 0.54* 0.74* 0.68* 0.66* 0.61* 0.58* 0.56* 0.55*
t 10.2 10.56 10.00 10.17 10.29 10.30 10.6 10.72
R
2 0.10 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.180 . 170 . 170 . 17
πn,t+1?  π3,t+1 = αn  + βn [R120,t ? R 3,t] + residt+1  (Fixed Effects Model)
Whole  Before Inf. After IT Regime
Period Targeting 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year
60:10 - 97:12 77:1 - 91:12 77:1 - 92:12 77:1 - 93:12 77:1 - 94:12 77:1 - 95:12 77:1 - 96:12 77:1 - 97:12
Est. βn 0.54* 0.75* 0.68* 0.66* 0.60* 0.58* 0.56* 0.55*
t 10.9 10.63 9.98 10.13 10.17 10.17 10.44 10.58
R
2 0.10 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.180 . 170 . 170 . 17
Constant Terms
Canada 0.03 -0.14- 0 . 2 1 -0.32 -0.29 -0.35 -0.42 -0.45
Finland -0.51 -0.52 -0.50 -0.55 -0.66 -0.69 -0.71 -0.72
Sweden -0.19 -0.73 -0.48 -0.58 -0.67 -0.77 -0.76 -0.80
United Kingdom 0.04 -0.80 -0.77 -0.74 -0.75 -0.77 -0.75 -0.75
π n,t+1?  π 3,t+1 = α n  +  β n [R120,t ? R3,t] + resid t+1  (Common Effects Model)
Whole  Before Inf. After IT Regime
Period Targeting 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year
60:10 - 97:12 77:1 - 91:12 77:1 - 92:12 77:1 - 93:12 77:1 - 94:127 7 : 1 - 95:12
Est. β n 0.44* 0.47* 0.44* 0.43* 0.40* 0.38*
t 10.00 7.60 7.60 7.74 7.90 8.20
R
2 0.09 0.130 . 120 . 120 . 11 0.10
π n,t+1?  π 3,t+1 = α n  +  β n [R120,t ? R3,t] + resid t+1  (Fixed Effects Model)
Whole  Before Inf. After IT Regime
Period Targeting 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year
60:10 - 97:12 77:1 - 91:12 77:1 - 92:12 77:1 - 93:12 77:1 - 94:127 7 : 1 - 95:12
Est. β n 0.46* 0.49* 0.46* 0.45* 0.41*0 . 3 8 *
t 10.3 7.70 7.60 7.76 7.83 7.70
R
2 0.09 0.140 . 130 . 120 . 120 . 11
Constant Terms
Canada 0.13 -0.07 -0.13- 0 . 2 1 -0.17- 0 . 2 1
Finland 0.40 0.49 -0.49 -0.52 -0.61 -0.60
Spain 0.41 -0.13- 0 . 15- 0 . 12- 0 . 2 8 - 0 . 4 3
Sweden -0.11 -0.56 -0.39 -0.49 -0.57 -0.66
United Kingdom 0.14 -0.70 -0.69 -0.64 -0.63 -0.64 
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United Kingdom 1.03 4.55












UK -2.16- 7 . 4 1
PANEL 3
Common Effects Model
IT countries only in their exchange rate targeting periods
Period 1962:01 to 1997:12
PANEL 2
Common Effects Model
IT countries only in their money targeting periods
Period 1975:01 to 1989:2
PANEL 1
Common Effects Model
         IT countries only in their inflation targeting periods          








RECURSIVE ESTIMATION RESULTS - INFLATION-CHANGE 
EQUATIONS FOR EU NOMINIES 








Whole Before After  MT
Period MT 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year
71:01 - 97:127 7 : 1 - 92:01 77:1 - 93:02 77:1 - 94:02 77:01 - 95:2 77:01 - 96:02 77:01 - 97:02
AUSTRIA Est. βn 0.07 0.34* 0.36* 0.38* 0.32* 0.28* 0.23*
t 1.47 2.51 3.01 3.21 2.82 2.54 2.21
R
2
0.03 0.9 0.120 . 130 . 100 . 0 80 . 0 6
Whole Before After  MT
Period MT 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year
60:10 - 97:127 7 : 1 - 92:01 77:1 - 93:02 77:01 - 94:02 77:01 - 95:02 77:01 - 96:02 77:01 - 97:02
BELGIUM Est. βn 0.28 (-)0.34* (-)0.32* (-)0.30 (-)0.27 (-)0.23 (-)0.23*
t 1.47 (-)1.90* (-)1.80 (-)1.67 (-)1.74 (-)1.74 (-)1.97
R
2
0.03 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
Whole Before After  MT
Period MT 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year
71:05 - 97:127 7 : 0 1 - 92:01 77:01 - 93:02 77:01 - 94:02 77:01 - 95:02 77:01 - 96:02 77:01 - 97:12
FINLAND Est. βn 0.26* 0.40* 0.40* 0.39* 0.33* 0.32* 0.29*
t 2.51 3.02 3.13 3.04 3.06 3.183 . 15
R
2
0.09 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.20
Whole Before After  MT
Period EMU 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year
70:01 - 97:127 7 : 0 1 - 92:01 77:01 - 93:02 77:01 - 94:02 77:01 - 95:02 77:01 - 96:02 77:01 - 97:02
FRANCE Est. βn 0.36* 0.51* 0.30 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.16
t 2.02 1.56 1.24 1.10 1.25 1.16 1.02
R
2
0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Whole Before After  MT
Period EMU 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year
60:10 - 97:127 7 : 0 1 - 92:01 77:01 - 93:02 77:01 - 94:02 77:01 - 95:02 77:01 - 96:02 77:01 - 97:02
GERMANY Est. βn 0.15* 0.26* 0.31*0 . 3 2 * 0 . 3 1* 0.29* 0.25*
t 2.53 2.47 3.40 3.60 3.70 3.64 3.10
R
2







RECURSIVE ESTIMATION RESULTS - INFLATION-CHANGE 
EQUATIONS FOR EU NOMINIES 







Whole Before After  EMU
Period EMU 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year
72:1 - 97:3 77:1 - 92:1 77:1 - 93:1 77:1 - 94:1 77:1 - 95:1 77:1 - 96:1 77:1 - 97:1
Est. βn 0.11 0.62* 0.43 0.43 0.35 0.37 0.37
IRELAND t 0.54 2.19 1.811 .87 1.77 1.78 1.84
R
2
0.00 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
Whole Before After  EMU
Period EMU 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year
77:03 - 97:12 77:03 - 92:01 77:03 - 93:02 77:03 - 94:02 77:03 - 95:02 77:03 - 96:02 77:03 - 97:02 
Est. βn 0.58 1.02 0.92 0.90 0.75 0.62 0.59
ITALY t 1.35 1.69 1.63 1.65 1.60 1.37 1.33
R
2
0.04 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.04
Whole Before After  EMU
Period EMU 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year
64:01 - 97:127 7 : 0 1 - 92:01 77:01 - 93:02 77:01 - 94:02 77:01 - 95:02 77:01 - 96:02 77:01 - 97:02
Est. βn -0.09 -0.12- 0 . 10 (-)0.09 (-)0.09 (-)0.07 (-)0.06
NETHERLAND t -0.82 -1.14- 1.06 (-)0.99 (-)1.07 (-)0.85 (-)0.70
R
2
0.009 0.0140 . 0 1 0.009 0.001 0.006 0.004
Whole Before After  EMU
Period EMU 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year
84:4 - 97:12 84:04 - 92:01 84:04 - 93:02 84:04 - 94:02 84:04 - 95:02 84:04 -96:02 84:4 - 97:2
Est. βn (-)0.53* (-)0.67* (-)0.68* (-)0.66* (-)0.54* (-)0.54* (-)0.54*
PORTUGAL t (-)4.46 (-)5.45 -4.97 (-)4.93 (-)4.15( - ) 4 . 11 (-)4.31
R
2
0.21 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.21
Whole Before After  EMU
Period EMU 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year
76:01 - 97:127 7 : 0 1 - 92:01 77:01 - 93:02 77:01 - 94:02 77:01 - 95:02 77:01 - 96:02 77:01 - 97:02
Est. βn (-)0.16* (-)0.16* (-)0.16* (-)0.16* (-)0.18( - ) 0 . 19( - ) 0 . 18*
SPAIN t (-)3.56* (-)3.90* (-)3.90* (-)3.9* (-)4.76* (-)5.2* (-)5.10*
R
2

















πn,t+1?  π3,t+1 = αn  +  βn [R120,t ? R3,t] + resid t+1  (Common Effects Model)
Whole After  MT 
Period 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year
60:10 - 97:127 7 : 0 1 - 91:01 77:01 - 92:2 77:01 - 93:2 77:01 - 94:2 77:01 - 95:2 77:01 - 96:2 77:01 - 97:2
Est. βn 0.16* 0.16* 0.15* 0.13* 0.13* 0.11*0 . 10* 0.10*
t 5.61 3.83 3.55 3.45 3.41 0.01 3.21 3.28
R
2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
πn,t+1?  π3,t+1 = αn  +  βn [R120,t ? R3,t] + resid t+1  (Fixed Effects Model)
Whole Before After  MT 
Period MT 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year
60:10 - 97:127 7 : 0 1 - 91:01 77:01 - 92:2 77:01 - 93:2 77:01 - 94:2 77:01 - 95:2 77:01 - 96:2 77:01 - 97:2
Est. βn 0.21* 0.18* 0.17* 0.17* 0.17* 0.14* 0.13* 0.12*
t 6.75 3.72 3.69 3.99 4.23 3.94 3.76 3.67
R
2 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Constant Terms
Austria -0.45 -0.16- 0 . 13- 0 . 17- 0 . 2 1 -0.25 -0.27 -0.31
Belgium 0.09 -0.16- 0 . 16- 0 . 17- 0 . 18- 0 . 2 1 -0.21 -0.25
Finland -0.07 -0.39 -0.45 -0.49 -0.49 -0.53 -0.49 -0.44
France 0.15 -0.39 -0.42 -0.38 -0.35 -0.34 -0.37 -0.40
Germany -0.22 -0.03 0.03 -0.06 -0.16- 0 . 19- 0 . 19- 0 . 2 0
Italy -0.130 . 2 50 . 130 . 140 . 13 0.09 -0.08 -0.13
Netherlands -0.22 -0.36 -0.36 -0.34 -0.35 -0.34 -0.32 -0.30
Portugal -1.59 -1.32 -1.54 -1.71 -1.77 -1.70 -1.61 -1.53








Whole Before  Inf. After IT
Period Targeting
60:10 - 97:12 60:10 - 91:12 92:1 - 97:12
Est. β n 0.22* 0.27* 0.03
t 8.55 8.59 1.68
R
2 0.02 0.03 0.00
Whole Before  Inf. After  IT
Period Targeting
60:10 - 97:12 60:10 - 91:129 2 : 1 -97-12
Est.  0.22* 0.30* 0.02
t 8.67 9.67 1.4
R
2 0.04 0.05 0.13
Constant  t - stat Constant t - stat Constant t - stat
AUSTRIA -0.48 -4.59 -0.44 -3.32 -0.77 -11.95
BELGIUM 0.07 0.60 0.14 1.06 -0.35 -5.40
CANADA 0.41 3.94 0.52 4.46 0.05 0.43
DENMARK -0.98 -8.38 -1.60 -10.3 0.193 . 5 4
FINLAND -0.09 -0.52 -0.02 -0.10- 0 . 18- 1.67
FRANCE 0.140 . 9 9 0 . 2 7 1.58 -0.36 -6.24
GERMANY -0.24 -2.90 -0.16- 1.62 -0.97 -9.63
ICELAND -0.62 -2.95 -0.09 -0.53
ITALY -0.13 -0.62 0.150 . 5 1 -0.68 -4.95
JAPAN -0.28 -1.26 -0.17 -0.59 -0.46 -3.42
KOREA -0.18 -0.44 -0.48 -0.83 -0.26 -1.43
NETHERLAND -0.25 -2.29 -0.29 -2.17- 0 . 19- 3 . 17
NORWAY 0.22 1.52 0.30 1.61 0.13 1.67
PORTUGAL -1.63 -4.35 -1.77 -2.97 -1.28 -7.95
SOUTH AFRICA 0.93 6.07 1.20 6.99 -0.92 -3.72
SPAIN 0.311 .63 0.74 3.02 -0.71 -6.11
SWEDEN 0.120 . 9 2 0 . 2 6 1.87 -0.83 -5.12
SWITZERLAND -0.40 -3.04 -0.24 -1.42 -0.71 -5.98
UNITED KINGDOM 0.43 1.93 0.50 1.88 0.04 0.37
USA 0.17 1.44 0.26 1.90 -0.21 -2.99
PANEL RESULTS
Fixed Effects Model
π n,t+1?  π 3,t+1 = α n  +  β n [R120,t ? R3,t] + resid t+1 
PANEL RESULTS
Common Effects Model




FOR ALL COUNTRIES (EXCLUDING CANADA, FINLAND, SPAIN, 




Whole Before  Inf. After IT
Period Targeting
60:10 - 97:126 0 : 10 - 91:129 2 : 1 - 97:12
Est. β n 0.11*0 . 14* 0.005
t 3.48 3.49 0.24
R
2 0.01 0.01 0.00
Whole  Before Inf. After IT
Period Targeting
60:10 - 97:126 0 : 10 - 91:12 92:1 -97-12
Est. β n 0.10* 0.13* 0.03
t 3.163 . 4 11 .38
R
2 0.03 0.04 0.13
Constant t - stat Constant t - stat Constant t - stat
AUSTRIA -0.27 -2.56 -0.153 . 4 0- 0 . 7 7 - 11.93
BELGIUM 0.18 1.56 0.28 -1.13- 0 . 3 5 - 5 . 3 9
DENMARK -0.79 -7.13- 1. 2 72 . 0 40 . 193 . 4 8
FRANCE 0.20 1.41 0.35 -8.59 -0.36 -6.24
GERMANY -0.08 -0.91 0.07 1.99 -0.97 -9.57
ICELAND -0.29 -1.45 -0.10- 0 . 5 5
ITALY -0.11 -0.52 0.14 0.67 -0.68 -4.95
JAPAN -0.25 -1.10- 0 . 17 0.47 -0.46 -3.42
KOREA 0.03 0.07 0.01 -0.57 -0.26 -1.42
NETHERLAND -0.07 -0.64 -0.06 0.02 -0.19- 3 . 15
NORWAY 0.19 1.33 0.23 -0.43 0.13 1.67
PORTUGAL -1.39 -3.71 -1.43 1.24 -1.28 -7.94
SOUTH AFRICA 1.197 . 6 11 .55 -2.40 -0.92 -3.70
SWITZERLAND -0.38 -2.81 -0.25 8.94 -0.71 -5.97
USA 0.27 2.180 . 3 6 - 1.44 -0.21 -2.97
π n,t+1?  π 3,t+1 = α n  +  β n [R120,t ? R3,t] + resid t+1 
PANEL RESULTS
Common Effects Model












Whole Before  Inf. After IT
Period Targeting
60:10 - 97:12 60:10 - 91:12 92:1 - 97:12
Est. βn 0.26* 0.32* 0.02
t 6.59 6.62 0.99
R
2 0.03 0.03 0.00
Whole  Before Inf. After IT
Period Targeting
60:10 - 97:12 60:10 - 91:12 92:1 -97-12
Est. βn 0.24* 0.33* 0.02
t 6.01 6.96 0.61
R
2 0.04 0.06 0.10
Constant t - stat  Constant t - stat  Constant t - stat
CANADA 0.39 3.59 0.49 4.09 0.07 0.55
DENMARK -1.00 -7.96 -1.66 -9.84 0.193 . 5 5
ICELAND -0.65 -2.93 -0.07 -0.41
JAPAN -0.28 -1.27 -0.17 -0.59 -0.45 -3.31
KOREA -0.21 -0.51 -0.57 -0.99 -0.27 -1.48
NORWAY 0.23 1.54 0.32 1.67 0.14 1.69
SOUTH AFRICA 0.90 5.34 1.14 5.83 -0.90 -3.57
SWEDEN 0.10 0.80 0.24 1.63 -0.83 -5.00
SWITZERLAND -0.40 -3.06 -0.24 -1.41 -0.70 -5.81
UNITED KINGDOM 0.42 1.85 0.47 1.76 0.05 0.47
USA 0.16 1.33 0.25 1.76 -0.19 -2.52
Fixed Effects Model
πn,t+1?  π3,t+1 = αn  +  βn [R120,t ? R3,t] + resid t+1 
PANEL RESULTS
Common Effects Model
πn,t+1?  π3,t+1 = αn  +  βn [R120,t ? R3,t] + resid t+1 
PANEL RESULTS